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METHODOLOGY AND VALUES IN AMERICAN
LEGAL EDUCATION: SOME INTERACTIONS
AND RECIPROCAL INFLUENCES
Any study of dominant trends in philosophy of law in American law schools
at the present day must take note of distinctive organizational and institutional
features, peculiar to the American scene and distinct from those existing in other
countries, which so largely shape and condition American lawyers and law pro-
fessors' attitudes to questions of values in law. For the American law school, in con-
trast to law schools in other countries and even those in England and most of the
Commonwealth countries,1 is a professional school, in design and in emphasis.
2
It is, of course, a graduate school, though a graduate school without any specific
correlation or liaison with the program in undergraduate schools or colleges, and
without therefore any continuing common core curriculum requirement for its
freshmen entrants. 3 The fact that the law school is a graduate school has, however,
been used as a successful argument that the law schools should purge themselves of
all erstwhile liberal arts tendencies in their own curricula.4 Legal History5 and Ro-
man Law in the law schools have been dead for years; Jurisprudence (Philosophy
of Law) has dwindled away into a twilight option attended in the sophomore year
or not at all; 6 Constitutional History, Political Science, and similar courses seem not
to have been taught in the law schools in three quarters of a century. Of course,
the demise of these particular subjects in the law school was undoubtedly hastened
by indifferent professorial teaching and research in them: they were usually as-
1. See generally Griswold, English and American Legal Education, 4 THE JOURNAL OF
THE SOCIETY OF PUBLIC TEACHERS OF LAW (New Series) 131 (1958).
2. "In the United States, legal education is dominated by a new institutional type, the
professional law school. [Footnote omitted] Originating in the initial era as a proprietary
substitute for apprentice preparation for legal practice, it is of interest to observe how these
institutions have acquired a recognized place in the universities so as to give academic
prestige to what is basically training in the trade." Yntema, Looking Out of the Cave -
Some Remarks on Comparative Legal Research, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS
OF LEGAL RESEARCH 67 (Conard ed., 1955). This article by Yntema was reprinted in 54
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 899 (1956).
3. ". . . There has been no effective control over nonvocational prerequisites of admission
to legal study. For a time, in fact, these were negligible, and the law schools actually com-
peted with the colleges for students. Today, this has been partly remedied, and a modicum
of cultural preparation is needed to enter law school or to qualify for the bar. But there
is no agreement on what such preparation should be and no real disposition to look be-
hind the high school or college diplomas to make sure that applicants are in fact qualified.
The law schools automatically accept the more or less standardized products of the system
of public or private instruction." Id. at 68-9.
4. "Reinforced by the concrete method of case study later introduced by Langdell, this
vocational conception [in the American law school] a fortiori disclaimed responsibility either
to instruct the layman in what he should know about government by law in a democracy
or to consider law in the light of reason, justice, or science. Such matters were left to the
colleges and universities, upon which also devolved the development of the social sciences
generally." Id. at 68.
5. Murphy, Legal History as a Course, 10 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 79 (1957).
6. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Teaching of Jurisprudence in the United States, 4 JOUR-
NAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 117 (1951); and compare Graveson, The Teaching of Jurispru-
dence in England and Wales, 4 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 127 (1951).
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signed to the most junior members of the faculty, who were but rarely interested
in them, but this was, in itself, largely a product of the law school governors'
disdain for the old pre-Langdell conception of legal practice as a liberal profession.
I do not want to yield too much to the current temptation to blame Langdell
for the current "professionalism," as opposed to an erstwhile "liberalism," in the
American law school, or to hold him personally responsible for "all that has gone
wrong" in American legal education in recent years. He has, in this regard, even
been assailed, and by one of the foremost among the American Legal Realists at
that, with the charge of inculcating an ivory-tower approach, with producing
an unwholesome divorcement of American legal education from the actualities
of day-by-day practice.7 Taking any sort of historically deterministic approach
to American legal education it was probably inevitable, Langdell or no, that with
the demands of the new industrial entrepreneur after the Civil War and especially
at the turn of the century for a more efficient legal approach to technical prob-
lems of corporate organization and practice, some more rigorous and scientific
system of legal education should be developed in the law schools.S The criticism
- if criticism be warranted on the score that the law schools emphasize a narrow
vocationalism - would be more fairly directed, not at Langdell, but at his latter-
day disciples. In taking note of the jejune quality of American legal education
at the time of, and immediately after, the Civil War - legal education, at Har-
vard, at the time, was, in Holmes' own words, "almost a disgrace" 9 - Langdell
may be pardoned perhaps for confusing its overall quality of humanism with the
sloppiness and inefficiency with which it was conducted. 10 I do not know, how-
7. "American legal education went badly wrong some seventy years ago when it was se-
duced by a brilliant neurotic. I refer to the well-known founder of the so-called case sys-
tem, Christopher Columbus Langdell. I call him a neurotic advisedly. He was a cloistered,
bookish man, and bookish, too, in a narrow sense....
"His pedagogic theory reflected the man. The experience of the lawyer in his office,
with clients, and in the courtroom with judges and juries, were, to Langdell, improper
material for the teacher and his student. They must, he insisted, shut their eyes to such
data. They must devote themselves exclusively to what was discoverable in the library ...
The neurotic escapist character of Langdell stamped itself on the educational programs
of our leading law schools." Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE LAW JOURNAL
1303, 1303-4 (1947).
8. "Fundamental change in legal education went naturally with the drift of law business
and of main currents of thought in the United States after 1870. Leadership fell to the
Harvard Law School through the accidents of personality; if it had not come there, some
other school must shortly have taken the lead under the driving force of the times. Events
now demanded of the bar knowledge and skills not within the sonorous phrases of the 'con-
stitutional lawyer' of mid-century or the black-letter learning of the conveyancer. . . . The
new problems brought a pressure for more thorough and rigorous intellectual training in
the law." HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 260-1 (1950).
9. See generally Howe, Oliver Wendell Holmes at Harvard Law School, 70 HARVARD LAW
REviEW 401, 417-8 (1957).
10. The intellectually broadest and most varied period in American legal education seems,
ironically enough, to have been the colonial period at the close of the eighteenth century
-highlighted by the work of Chancellor Wythe and St. George Tucker at William and
Mary, and by Kent at Columbia: "[Their work] was marked by a breadth of treatment
which did not appear again in formal legal education until the 1920's. These men saw
legal education as a proper part of a liberal education. Accordingly, they introduced their
students and readers to a framework of general ideas in jurisprudence; and they gave them
some picture of the law of nations and of constitutional law, not as a superficial adornment
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ever, that Langdell's latter-day successors can be pardoned for perpetuating that
err6r or for allowing it to be concretized further in special institutional and pro-
cedural devices that have since become the pattern for most of the law schools
of the common law world. I mean here, among other things, the institution of
the Law Journal with its attendant self-perpetuating skill-type, the law journal
editor;" and I mean the case system of legal education. In a way the two are,
in an American setting, inextricably intertwined. The case system, as practiced
and developed in the major American law schools, is undoubtedly responsible for
some of the cardinal and continuing characteristics of law journal policy and
practice; just as, in its turn, the law journal system, by developing a "caste" tra-
dition around its own numbers, has tended to produce an accepted hierarchical
progression - law journal editorship, law clerkship, law professorship1 2 - with
a consequent reinforcement of attitudes and outlook already there.
The apogee of success in the American law school is undoubtedly election to
the Law Journal board, and then subsequently election to one of the Cabinet
posts (Editor-in-Chief, Articles Editor, Comment Editor, etc.) on the Journal.
Some like Jerome Frank have campaigned against the Law Journal's exclusive-
ness;13 others have argued whether its very success may not pose a major psycho-
logical problem of providing necessary prestige symbols for those who are not
fortunate enough to secure election to the board - a lesser or second-string law
of more bread-and-butter matters, but as necessary to a lawyer's proper grasp of his sub-
ject." HURST, op. cit. supra, note 8 at 258.
Some elements of this academic liberalism seem to have survived, together with an ex-
traordinary element of student indiscipline and laxness, at the Harvard Law School in the
era of Parker, Washburn, and Parsons, immediately preceding Langdell's appointment as
Dean in 1870. Howe, Oliver Wendell Holmes at Harvard Law School, 70 HARVARD LAW
REVIEw 401 (1957); HowE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS,
1841-1870 176 et. seq. (1957). Langdell, however, "ruthlessly sheared off such faint be-
ginnings as his predecessors had made in political and economic studies allied to law."
HURST, op. cit. supra, note 8 at 263.
11. "[Law] is not kept esoteric vis-A-vis the student who, after a year, can become a law
review editor, which involves sometimes editing his professors (even reviewing his case-
books, the only 'books' the professor is apt to 'write') or taking issue with them in student
notes and comments on recent decisions. There are some 150 law reviews, often subsidized
by the school as part of its public-relations work or as due its image of itself, and of course
often also guided by the faculty. But there is, so far as I know, nothing comparable to
this development in the graduate school, despite the frequently lesser professionalization
of the latter (or perhaps because of this). . . . Graduate students do not run the social
science (or humanities) periodicals and lack the confident impetus this involves. Law-
review and other law students more than compensate for the lacunae of their teachers by
educating each other." Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Col-
leagueship, 9 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 643, 648 (1957).
12. "I know the power of the system, because I made a quixotic effort to overthrow it
when I was a student at Harvard Law School: I sought to persuade Professor Felix Frank-
furter and other faculty men to send to the various judgeships of which Harvard held
the clerkship patronage, gifted students who were not law-review men. I got nowhere:
if the students were good, they would be on the law review." Id. at 649.
13. Thus, as a visiting member of the Yale Law School faculty, Judge Frank used to in-
veigh against what he regarded as an excessive concentration of student energies on the
Law Journal to the exclusion of the Legal Aid Society, Barristers' Union, and other activi-
ties less pre-occupied with (in Frank's own term) "appellate-court-itis." McWhinney [Book
Review], 33 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 111, 113 (1957).
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journal (intramural law review) 14 for those who do not make the first division.
But none can deny the law journal's status. I do not want to enter into a debate
on the wisdom of necessarily arbitrary classifications of this sort made in regard
to young people scarcely out of their teens, when these same classifications are
accepted as criteria influencing or determining subsequent professional advance-
ment in later life. Perhaps such classifications do not pay enough regard to
possible late maturing of individual talent. But they do, in a way, answer the
deeply-felt American need for establishment of competitive standards in the
professions to which all can aspire and which the most able can attain; in this
sense, if the American legal profession must be 6litist in its organization it will,
at least, be a democratically-recruited 6lite. The able and ambitious, whatever
their financial, or for that matter social or ethnic, background, can ascend to
the top.15
What I do question in the law journal system are some of its long-range
effects on legal education and on legal scholarship and thinking in the United
States. The American law journals are models of concentrated research and
scholarship, but it is an essentially low-level, problem-oriented research and
scholarship.16 American legal education as a whole is problem-oriented too -
here I hark back to the case system once more -but the law journals are even
more so. The model of law journal research is the case-note or case-comment
- masterpieces of exhaustion of detail but singularly lacking in broad principle
or philosophy.' 7 Of course this condition is understandable, granted student
editorship and a student editorship that changes, as to its key decision-making
posts, each twelve months. Such philosophy as there is must normally be de-
veloped ad hoc or else carried on mechanically from year to year. What I
doubt is whether this system, even with some of the veiled pressures and advice
that come from the faculty (especially in the smaller schools), can provide that
opportunity for long-range reflection and in particular for the continuing re-
examination of ultimate goals and objectives and of the relationship of particular
instruments for achieving particular ends to those ends themselves, that is neces-
sary for any profession that hopes to keep alive and vital. Anyone reading the
major American law journals at the present day must be struck by the absence
of sustained policy-type discussion in their pages.1 8 An attempt to counter this
14. Such an Intramural Law Review was, in fact, introduced at the New York University
School of Law several years ago, as an autonomous student-edited journal separate and dis-
tinct from the existing New York University Law Review. Riesman mentions, somewhat
facetiously, that he himself attempted (quite abortively) to start "another law review with
nonlaw-review men" at Harvard. Riesman, op. cit. supra, note 11 at 649.
15. "Naturally, the confidence that comes of believing this [that law school marks are in-
fallible]- believing that one got one's start through ability and not looks or luck (confi-
dence which in other versions has been part of the dynamism of the self-made man)- is
purchased at the cost of others being robbed of confidence." Ibid.
16. See, especially, the pungent criticisms by Miller, A Modest Proposal for Changing Law
Review Formats, 8 JOURNAL Op LEGAL EDUCATION 89 (1955).
17. There may, however, be a certain.element of consumer (the practicing profession, at
least) approval of present law journal policy as to internal organization. See the survey
(on a somewhat different point) made by Mueller and Skolnick, Bar Reactions to Legal
Periodicals: The West Virginia Survey, 11 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 197 (1958).
18. Thus, Dean Stason of the University of Michigan Law School has posed the question
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omission is the mild Editorial - strictly an advance-prospectus - that has
been appearing in the Harvard Law Review regularly in the last several years.
And the law professors themselves, aware of the danger, have themselves pro-
vided some corrective with the professor-edited, general principle-oriented journals
like the Journal of Legal Education,1 9 and Law and Contemporary Problems,2 0
that can face up to problems of possible synthesis of competing ideas in law at
the present day. But these journals are of relatively recent origin and as yet
may lack the full prestige and influence of the older, student-edited journals of
the "national" law schools.
I have mentioned already the developed pattern of hierarchical progression
from law journal editor to law professor. This leads me to the plight of profes-
sorial scholarship in law, at the present day, in the United States. When I speak
of "plight" I do not mean to imply that there is not an extraordinarily high
standard of scholarship in American law, or that American professors do not
work extremely hard - harder, certainly, than their counterparts in the Com-
monwealth countries. The competitive system for promotions, in operation in
the major American law schools, would, I think, be enough by itself to ensure
a constant and continuing literary output, at least until the last promotion hurdle
is cleared, though most professors at the major schools seem to work without
any such artificial incentives. But it is the character of the research that I want
to direct attention to, not its quantity or its abstract quality. The prime research
outlet in the American law school is the casebook: it is, as a percipient American
scholar has observed, the built-in prestige symbol of American legal scholar-
ship.2 1 Now a casebook, as its name implies, is primarily a scissors-and-paste
job - a collection of court decisions loosely stuck together with explanatory
headnotes or footnotes. 2 2 I am not denying that a form of interstitial scholar-
ship may emerge from the casebooks - Dean Griswold points out that many
scholarly notes are embedded in them.2 3 But the point is that the scholarship
tellingly: "Are the law reviews and law journals, prolific as they are, diluting unduly our
constructive and productive efforts? Are we in academic pursuits taking on numerous mi-
nuscule literary jobs, worthy in themselves, but serving to bar us from effective prosecution
of large-scale research?" Stason, in CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RE-
SEARCH 4-5 (Conard ed., 1955). And see also Miller, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 89.
19. Published by the Association of American Law Schools, the general body representing
American law professors, and now (1958-59) in its eleventh volume. It is edited for the
Association by members of the Faculty of Law at Duke University.
20. A quarterly, published by the Faculty of Law at Duke University.
21. "For a generation, the typical, almost the exclusive, book-size production of legal schol-
arship has been the casebook. A casebook in print is the symbol of professional contribu-
tion and status." Hurst, Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 10 JOURNAL
oF LEGAL EDUCATION 147, 158 (1957).
22. "This generation of legal scholars finds that the challenge to master a field of the law
consists in showing that it can be reduced to teachable proportions. It is a commentary
upon how little serious commitment to basic research there is in the law school world that
casebook production should so long have enjoyed the prime claim on our creative energies."
Ibid.
23. "There have been a relatively few law teachers who have worked hard and effectively
to broaden and diversify the contribution of the law schools to knowledge and to the ap-
plication of knowledge to the improvement of the law. But law schools generally have not
been notably successful in opening up new fields for research activities and new methods
for their pursuit. In this, law teachers have lagged far behind their fellows working in the
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in the casebooks is interstitial, the intellectual discussion being fragmented and
dissipated and in no sense comprehensive and synthesizing.2 4 And on the whole
the patterns of casebook organization tend to be standardized or conventionalized
throughout the country in regard to selection and organization of materials for
discussion, with little opportunity, in consequence, for innovation or the break-
ing of new ground; and so much sheer physical energy goes into the checking
for accuracy of case citation and other purely mechanical tasks associated with
the preparation of the casebook, that little professorial energy seems to remain
for professorial research and writing other than the conventional law review
case-comment type article, the traditional "filler" material for casebooks.
2 5
It is a red-letter day in an American law school when someone publishes an inde-
pendent monograph treatise, and then it is more than likely to be written by an
advanced scholar - Harold Lasswell or Filmer Northrop, both now of the
Yale Law School faculty, for example - who has strayed into the law school
after making his name in another discipline.
fields of the natural sciences, including medicine, and well behind many of those working
in other areas of the social sciences.
". .. Law teachers turn naturally to the compilation of teaching materials (in which
many scholarly notes are imbedded), and to the writing of articles on questions that come
to the fore in the classroom. This leaves little opportunity for inquiries in other directions
or for the development of basic studies which would involve investigations into the actual
operation of legal processes and institutions." Griswold, Harvard Law School, Dean's Re-
port, 1957-1958 11-12.
24. "The research that will make a good casebook need go no further than to turn up
stimulating questions within a quite generalized frame of reference; the function of the
casebook does not require its author to spend toil on answering the questions. Langdell's
stripped-down contracts casebook met all the responsibilities of research directed at course
construction. The extended commentaries of the current casebook edge toward quite a
different responsibility but typically avoid its fulfillment, striking a balance on limited is-
sues and disclaiming determinations on big ones. This is fitting enough for making useful
casebooks; it does not go more than part way, however, toward meeting the university's
obligation to advance knowledge of the legal order." Hurst, op. cit. supra, note 21 at 160.
25. Professorial preparation for the case method instruction, if that method is to adhere
faithfully to its stylized format of a series of responsive questions addressed by the professor
to the class, is also, it is to be noted, particularly time consuming. Griswold, Harvard Law
School, Dean's Report, 1957-1958, p. 12. Among other explanations suggested for the
marked lag in advanced research at the present day are the immense administrative ad-
juncts of education in the modem American law school. Stason, in CONFERENCE ON AImS
AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 5 (Conard ed., 1955). Dean 'Cavers speculates on
whether the American law school may not now have to develop a specialist research cadre on
the pattern successfully developed (through training in research for the Ph.D. degree) in the
American graduate school. Cavers, Manpower for Research, id. at 91 et seq.
The imagination and flexibility of the University administration (the Dean of the Law
Faculty, or even the University President) in actual utilization of existing intellectual re-
sources on the Law Faculty, especially scarce research intelligence, may be crucial. Thus
Llewellyn mentions that President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia succeeded in keep-
ing Mr. Justice Cardozo's posthumous papers out of Llewellyn's hands.- Llewellyn, id. at
30-1. On the other hand, a more perceptive administrator, Charles E. Clark, then Dean
of the Yale Law School, handled the brilliant but difficult Thurman Arnold with under-
standing and kindliness, with immediate and outstanding results from the viewpoint of
productive research: The Symbols of Government (1935) and The Folklore of Capitalism
(1937) appeared in quick succession. -Clark, id. at 177. And as to the general problem
of overall planning of research programs and handling of manpower for research, see
McDougal, The Policy-Science Approach to International Legal Studies, in LECTURES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE UNITED NATIONS 61 (Bishop ed., 1957).
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I have promised some examination of the case method of teaching in Ameri-
can law schools and I will not delay it longer. The case method seems to have
started, in part, as a simple revolution in teaching materials.2 6 Instead of the
loose, sprawling authorities referred to as adjuncts to the old pre-Civil War
lecture system of instruction, Langdell planned at Harvard a more concise, core
set of materials - a group, so to speak, of ideal cases representing the best in
the continuing common law tradition.2 7 It was this emphasis on the ideal case,
with the built-in implication of timelessness in law that caused Jerome Frank,
I am sure, to advance his most devastating criticism of Langdell as encouraging
an unwholesome isolation of legal education from legal practice. 2 8 But it is not
the case method as practiced by Langdell that we are concerned with but the
case method of this post-World War II era as developed and refined and ex-
tended under the influence of the American Realists and the sociological school
of law. One should beware, of course, of assuming too easily that the case method
must mean the very same thing to everyone who employs it - Dean Griswold
reminds us that Ames and Williston could conduct a class of almost any size,
with equanimity, with the case method;2 9 but he concedes that there are no
more Ames or Willistons around now (even at Harvard).30 What is a vibrant
exercise in the Socratic method with one teacher may, with a lesser man, be
reduced to a conversational mumble punctuated at fitful intervals by irrelevant
questions directed to the audience. But by and large the case method of
teaching, as practiced today in the American law school, has these elements in
common. It is interested in asking questions rather than in answering them; 31
it is problem, rather than principle, oriented;32 it is, in the Realist vein, attuned
26. See generally HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW. THE LAW MAKERS 260 et
seq. (1950); REUSCHLEIN, JURISPRUDENCE - ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS. A SURVEY OF
TAUGHT JURISPRUDENCE 78 (1951); A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY 140 et seq. (Goebel ed., 1955).
27. But note Morris Cohen's tempered criticism of Langdell's failure (due, in Morris
Cohen's view, to Langdell's ignorance of Roman law, ancient or modern) to see that the
common law was not a purely timeless logical system but merely a body of rules that grew
up, historically, under definite social conditions, in England.. COHEN, AMERICAN THOUGHT:
A CRITICAL SKETCH 151-6 (1954).
28. Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1303 (1947). And com-
pare also Morris Cohen's attack on Langdell's preoccupation with the late 18th century
in his rather irrational acceptance of the English common law of that particular era as
the "perfect embodiment of a completely rational legal system." COHEN, op. cit. Supra, note
27 at 152.
29. "Looking over the past, it seems fairly clear to me that a class of almost any size con-
ducted by Dean Ames or Professor Williston would provide better legal education than a
small class under a lesser teacher." Griswold, Harvard Law School, Dean's Report, 1957-
1958, p. 10.
30. Id. at 11.
31. Hurst, op. cit. supra, note 21 at 160.
32. "Today the most significant effect of [the Langdell school's] lack of any coherent phi-
losophy is shown by its influence in the restatement of the law. The doctrine of stare decisis
and the empiricist living from hand to mouth that is called 'deciding each case on its
merits' (without any guide on how to evaluate these merits) have made our actual law a
hopeless labyrinth. Clearly, there is no way out except by some process of selecting some rul-
ings and rejecting those that conflict with them. This, however, requires conscious examination
and evaluation of the policy of the law, for which there is no room in the tradition of
the Langdell school. The law is viewed as a perfect system, even though in practice it can-
not be so." COHEN, op. cit. supra, note 27 at 155.
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to the solution of single cases rather than the synthesis of long lines of decisions;
it is fact-conscious and emphasizes the ad hoc character of judicial decision
making;33 it aims at the identification of the competing interests (individual or
group) involved in any problem-situation rather than at any deep-seated explora-
tion of the psychological origins of those same interests or at an attempt at
scientific evaluation of them. 34 The dilemma over recourse to values in the
actual decision-making process - of preference for one competing interest rather
than another - is solved in an impressionistic, almost unconscious way. For
the governing values, on this particular type of approach, will be societal ones;
the differing interests pressed in the particular problem-situation are valid, in
true Jamesian fashion, simply because they are pressed;35 the ideal solution is
the one that least interferes with or disturbs the complex of interests being
pressed in society as a whole.36 What we have operating here, then, is philo-
sophical relativism - American legal Pragmatism in the best sense of the word.
Now there are very many who will see nothing wrong with Pragmatism as a
general philosophy of law and I have, in fact, no quarrel with them on the
general issue at this stage. The point is, simply, that what is really, in the ultimate,
a problem of values and value-choice is concealed in the interstices of metho-
dology. The crucial part of the decision-making process is, I believe, slurred
over and all too frequently ignored altogether in the general technique-oriented
law school approach.
It is, however, not until very recent years, and certainly until after World
War II, that this all-exclusive preoccupation with method has begun to present
any special problems for American law schools or American lawyers. I think
this fact is largely due to the erstwhile substantial agreement on fundamentals
33. Thus Roscoe Pound himself assailed the American Legal Realists' "insistence on the
unique single case rather than on the approximation to a uniform course of judicial be-
havior .... Radical neorealism seems to deny that there are rules or principles or concep-
tions or doctrines at all, because all judicial action, or at times much judicial action, can-
not be referred to them." Pound, The Call for a Realist jurisprudence, 44 HARVARD LAW
REVIEW 697, 707 (1931). However, Llewellyn, in replying to Pound, suggested that this
Realist emphasis could be explained, more simply, as a distrust of traditional legal rules
and concepts insofar as they purported to describe what either courts or people were actu-
ally doing; a distrust of the theory that traditional prescriptive rule-formulations were the
heavily operative factor in producing court decisions; and a belief in the worthwhileness
of grouping cases and legal situations into narrower categories than had been the practice
in the past. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism -Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1222, 1237 (1931).
34. This proposition applies especially to Roscoe Pound's interest-oriented, sociological
jurispiudence. See especially the discussion by Pound's student and authoritative interpre-
ter, Julius Stone. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 355 et seq. (1946).
35. WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE (1897); JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW
NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKINO (1907).
36. The association of James' thinking with Roscoe Pound's. Sociological Jurisprudence and
with contemporary American legal thought generally is both proximate and substantial.
STONE, Op. cit. supra, note 34 at 355-368; PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE -MEN AND IDEAS
OF THE LAW 516 et seq. (1953); Jones, Edwin Wilwhite Patterson: Man and Ideas, 57
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 607, 610 (1957). For analogous influences on American legal
thought, of the pragmatism of Charles Peirce, see Freund, Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HAR-
VARD LAW REVIEW 800 (1956); of the pragmatism of Dewey, see Frank, Modern and An-
cient Legal Pragmatism - John Dewey and Co. vs. Aristotle, 25 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
207 et seq. (1950).
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among American lawyers once the New Deal-Welfare State ideals had become
received majority opinion, and concomitantly while the Realist and sociological
drives in American law were at their height. The problems have come with
the great tension issues of the 1950's- problems of the necessary definition or
redefinition of relationships between man and the State -especially in the
internal security and race relations area. On these issues, clearly, there has been
no substantial community consensus as yet, and the dilemma of value-choice of
necessity could therefore no longer be smothered over or remain submerged.
Unfortunately American lawyers and law teachers seem to have been caught
largely unprepared because intellectually unequipped for its solution.
Now it would be wrong to suggest, in any crude, oversimplified way, that the
villain of the piece is the man who first thought of abolishing the compulsory
courses in Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law or in Legal History in the
American law school. A great deal of the blame undoubtedly rests with the
professional jurisprudes themselves. We are reminded that the American Realist
drive brought with it, thirty years ago, many bold calls to action, but little con-
crete action, 37 even (or, perhaps, especially) on the part of the Realists them-
selves. 38 The Realists, on the whole, were a protest movement, and had no
affirmative program for legal action to offer in place of the existing order that
37. "Taken alone, [the legal realist movement's] attitudes and methods are not adequate
to the opportunities and obligations of our time." McDougal, The Law School of the Fu-
ture: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE LAW JOUR-
NAL 1345 (1947).
". . . We have had little treatise production and a thin and uncertain trickle of mono-
graph publication about the law. Of course, we must reckon with the interruption of the
war; perhaps, too, the very pace of change might naturally be expected to outdistance
scholarly reflection upon it. But there was not a substantial research output in the decade
before the war. The stir in legal philosophy over 'realism' from the mid 1920's on pro-
duced many calls to bold work - and little work. And the excuse of the war's disturbance
begins to wear thin by 1957." Hurst, op. cit. supra, note 21 at 158.
Compare the blistering attack on the whole realist drive for integration of law and the
social sciences that culminated in the short-lived Center at Johns Hopkins University in
the late 19 20's - an attack made, albeit partly with tongue in cheek, by an elder states-
man of legal realism, Llewellyn: "Never in the long history of efforts toward social science
had there been as ill-considered, badly prepared, and' generally useless squandering of re-
search money as in the Hopkins experiment . . . . If you want to know what kept the
foundations from being interested in other than doctrinal legal research, the answer is the
Hopkins experiment ....
"[Underhill] Moore, for my money, put forward the absolute nadir of idiocy when he
tested out whether law has mystical operations by an elaborate, sustained set of observa-
tions and meterings and statistics on the non-effect, on the parking practices of people in
New Haven, of a change in the official traffic regulations in New Haven, which he had
carefully arranged to keep anybody in New Haven from knowing had occurred. This is
bottom. You'll never get below it, gentlemen. It's like the market at the bottom of 1932.
It can only go up from there." Llewellyn, Social Significance in Legal Problems, in CON-
FERENCE ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 10-11 (Conard ed., 1955).
38. But see the spirited reply by another realist, Judge Charles E. Clark (of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and formerly Dean of the Yale Law
School): ". . . Whatever the mistakes we made, we were at least willing to make them.
In other words, we got beyond the stage of talking to the stage of doing . . . . It seems
to me as I look around that there's one thing that we're now missing, and that is the
willingness to take a chance. Perhaps another way to put this is that we should have the
courage to try even if we fail." Clark, id. at 175.
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they were bent on overthrowing.3 9 And there is something to the suggestion
that sociological jurisprudence, as an essentially empiricist philosophy, is little
calculated to produce reflection on ultimate values in law.
When I consider the standard outstanding products of the contemporary
national law school in the United States - and I stress that I am considering,
now, the Law Journal editor-type, hard-working, intelligent, and dedicated as
he is - I think I see men who, in Isaiah Berlin's words, "pursue many ends,
often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de
facto way, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral
or aesthetic principle; [who] lead lives, perform acts, and entertain ideas that
are centrifugal rather than centripetal." 4 0 The American law school has, I think,
produced a generation of foxes - of low-level empiricists - at a time when the
need for devising ordering principles in law was never greater. The complete
atrophy at the present day of American thinking on Federalism (formerly so rich
and vibrant a subject of study), on political pluralism and the territorial dispersal
of power - has never been more apparent than in the confused and bitter
doctrinal debate in the aftermath of the 1954 Supreme Court decision on school-
segregation. 4 1 The problems of definition and redefinition of the relationship
of Man and State - the conventional area of political liberalism - in the con-
tinuing world condition of bipolarity of power has not been solved, Jencks
42
et alia notwithstanding. The need for a value or policy-oriented jurisprudence
(whether natural law or otherwise) has never been more apparent if we are to
supply the judiciary and practicing profession with some more affirmative guides
to decision-making in this crisis age.
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39. Note the shrewd assessment of the historical significance of the legal realist movement
in American law, advanced by Thurman Arnold, himself one of the realist notables of a
generation ago: "Realistic jurisprudence is a good medicine for a sick and troubled society.
The America of the early 1930's was such a society. But realism, despite its liberating
virtues, is not a sustaining food for a stable civilization." Arnold, Jerome Frank, 24 UNI-
VERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 633, 635 (1957).
40. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox. AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY'S VIEW OF HISTORY
1 (1953). For a thoughtful assessment of the potential contribution of Berlin's philosophy
of history in developing new philosophic perspectives for English law students, see the com-
ment by Jerome Hall, 44 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 321 (1958).
41. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. I am referring, here, to the group of major decisions handed down by the United
States Supreme 'Court in the Spring, 1957, court term. See especially Jencks v. United
States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
43. See, for example, Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Pro-
fessional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE LAW JOURNAL 203 (1943); McDougal,
The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Com-
munity, 56 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1345 (1947).
